State v. Dotts Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 42058 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
12-30-2014
State v. Dotts Respondent's Brief Dckt. 42058
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Dotts Respondent's Brief Dckt. 42058" (2014). Not Reported. 1903.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/1903
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDA 














Bonner Co. Case Nos. 
CR-2000-802, CR-2000-600 
MICHAEL ALMEN DOTTS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
______________ ) 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF BONNER 
HONORABLE BARBARA A. BUCHANAN 
District Judge 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
PAUL R. PANTHER 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
MARK W. OLSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 




KIMBERLY E. SMITH 
Deputy State Appellate 
Public Defender 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane 




TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................. ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................... 1 
Nature of the Case ................................................................................ 1 
Statement of Facts and Course of the Proceedings .............................. 1 
ISSUE .............................................................................................................. 3 
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................... 4 
Dotts Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred 
In Denying His I.C.R. 35(a) Motion To Correct An Illegal 
Sentence, And His I.C.R. 35(c) Motion To Correct The 
District Court's Computation Of Sentence ............................................ .4 
A. lntroduction ................................................................................. 4 
B. Standard Of Review .................................................................. .4 
C. The District Court Did Not Err In Denying Dotts' 
I.C.R. 35(a) Motion ..................................................................... 5 
D. The District Court Did Not Err In Denying Dotts' 
I.C.R. 35(c) Motion ..................................................................... 7 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................. 9 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ......................................................................... 10 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES PAGE 
Bates v. Murphy, 118 Idaho 239,796 P.2d 116 (1990) ......................................... 5 
Calkins v. May, 97 Idaho 402,545 P.2d 1008 (1976) ........................................... 6 
Dotts v. Little, 2014 Unpublished Opinion No. 814, 
Docket No. 42135 (Idaho App., November 14, 2014) ............................ 6, 7 
Gibson v. Bennett, 141 Idaho 270, 108 P.3d 417 (Ct. App. 2005) ........................ 6 
Mickelsen v. Idaho State Correctional Institution, 131 Idaho 352, 
955 P.2d 1131 (Ct. App. 1998) ................................................................... 5 
State v. Alsanea, 138 Idaho 733, 69 P.3d 153 (Ct. App. 2003) ............................ 5 
State v. Brashier, 130 Idaho 112, 937 P.2d 424 (Ct. App. 1997) .......................... 4 
State v. Clements, 148 Idaho 82,218 P.3d 1143 (2009) .................................. 4, 5 
State v. Covert, 143 Idaho 169, 139 P.3d 771 (Ct. App. 2006) ........................ .7, 8 
State v. Davis, 139 Idaho 731, 85 P .3d 1130 (Ct. App. 2003) .............................. 5 
State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 961 P.2d 641 (1988) .......................................... .4 
State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 101 P.3d 699 (2004) ............................................ 5 
State v. Kesling, 155 Idaho 673, 315 P.3d 861 (Ct. App. 2013) ............................ 8 
State v. Lute, 150 Idaho 837, 252 P.3d 1255 (2011) ........................................... .4 
State v. Mireles, 133 Idaho 690, 991 P.2d 878 (Ct. App. 1999) ............................ 5 
State v. Rhoades, 134 Idaho 862, 11 P.3d 481 (2000) ......................................... 6 
State v. Vasquez, 142 Idaho 67, 122 P.3d 1167 (Ct. App. 2005) ......................... 4 
State v. Vega, 113 Idaho 756,747 P.2d 778 (Ct. App. 1987) ............................... 6 
ii 
STATUTES 
I.C. § 18-309 .................................................................................................... 7 
I.C. § 19-2603 ....................................................................................................... 7 
I.C. § 20-228 ........................................................................................................ 6 
RULES 
I.C.R. 35 ...................................................................................................... passim 
iii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Michael A. Dotts appeals from the district court's denials of his I.C.R. 35(a) 
motion to correct an illegal sentence and I.C.R. 35(c) motion to correct the district 
court's computation of sentence. 
Statement of Facts and Course of the Proceedings 
In 2000, Dotts stole an ATV four-wheeler from the residence of a Bonner 
County deputy sheriff and traded it for methamphetamine. (PSI, p.2; PSI 
attachments, p.4.) In a separate incident, Dotts and other individuals utilized 
stolen checks to make unauthorized transactions totaling $927.89. (PSI, p.2; PSI 
attachments, pp.12-23.) Dotts pied guilty to one count of grand theft and one 
count of forgery. (R., Vol. I, pp.73-75.) The district court imposed concurrent 
unified sentences of 12 years, each with five years fixed. (R., Vol. I, pp.80-83; 
Vol. II, pp.75-78.) Over the next 10 years, Dotts was released on parole three 
times, only to violate his parole and be returned to custody each time. (See 
3/10/14 "Affidavit of Susie D. Jensen."1) During one of these periods of parole 
release, Dotts was incarcerated in Oregon on a different case for more than two 
years. (See Id.) 
In 2013, Dotts filed an I.C.R. 35(a) motion to correct an illegal sentence. 
(R., Vol. I, pp.169-173.) In the motion, Dotts argued that his sentence was illegal 
1 Dotts submitted this affidavit, which summarizes Dotts' Idaho and Oregon 
incarceration history, after the hearing on his I.C.R. 35 motions, but prior to the 
entry of the district court's order denying the motions. (See 3/10/14 "Affidavit of 
Susie D. Jensen"; R., Vol. I, pp.195-203.) The district court referenced the 
motion in its dismissal order. (R., Vol. I, pp.196, 201.) 
1 
because he was being detained beyond the maximum indeterminate 12-year 
term imposed by the district court. (Id.) The district court appointed counsel to 
represent Dotts on the motion. (R., Vol. I, pp.182-183.) Through appointed 
counsel, Dotts then filed an I.C.R. 35(c) motion to correct the district court's 
computation of credit for time served. (R., Vol. I, pp.191-192.) 
At a hearing on the two I.C.R. 35 motions, Dotts clarified his arguments. 
(See generally Tr.) With regard to the I.C.R. 35(a) motion, Dotts asserted that he 
should have received credit for time served while he was released on parole, 
and, in the alternative, the forfeiture of this "street time" constituted cruel and 
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Tr., p.7, L.11 - p.8, 
L.19.) With regard to the I.C.R. 35(c) motion, Dotts argued that he was entitled 
to credit for time he spent incarcerated in Oregon between 2011 and 2013. (Tr., 
p.7, Ls.5-10.) In support of this second motion, Dotts submitted an inmate log 
indicating that while he was incarcerated in Oregon, the Oregon Department of 
Corrections received a detainer request from Idaho. (Defendant's Exhibit A.) 
The district court denied both motions. (R., Vol. I, pp.195-203.) Dotts filed timely 
notices of appeal in both cases. (R., Vol. I, pp.204-206; Vol. II, pp.173-175.) The 
Idaho Supreme Court consolidated these appeals. (R., Vol. II, pp.180-181.) 
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ISSUE 
Dotts states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Dotts's Rule 35 
Motions? 
(Appellant's brief, p.3.) 
The state rephrases the issue as follows: 
Has Dotts failed to show that the district court erred in denying his I.C.R. 
35(a) motion to correct an illegal sentence, and his I.C.R. 35(c) motion to correct 
the district court's computation of sentence? 
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ARGUMENT 
Dotts Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Denying His I.C.R. 
35(a) Motion To Correct An Illegal Sentence, And His I.C.R. 35(c) Motion To 
Correct The District Court's Computation Of Sentence 
A. Introduction 
Dotts appeals from the district court's order denying his I.C.R. 35(a) 
motion to correct an illegal sentence, and his I.C.R. 35(c) motion to correct the 
district court's computation of its sentence. (See generally Appellant's brief.) 
However, a review of the applicable law reveals that I.C.R. 35 is not the proper 
mechanism for the challenges Dotts attempted to raise. Therefore, he cannot 
show that the district court erred in denying these motions. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"As a general matter, it is a question of law as to whether a sentence is 
illegal or was imposed in an illegal fashion, and this Court exercises free review 
over questions of law." State v. Lute, 150 Idaho 837, 839, 252 P.3d 1255, 1257 
(2011) (citing State v. Clements, 148 Idaho 82, 84,218 P.3d 1143, 1145 (2009)). 
Whether the trial court properly applied the law governing credit for time served is 
also question of law over which the appellate court exercises free review. State 
v. Vasquez, 142 Idaho 67, 68, 122 P.3d 1167, 1168 (Ct. App. 2005); State v. 
Brashier, 130 Idaho 112, 113, 937 P.2d 424, 425 (Ct. App. 1997). An appellate 
court defers to the trial court's findings of fact, however, unless those findings are 
unsupported by substantial and competent evidence in the record and are 
therefore clearly erroneous. State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 552-553, 961 P.2d 
4 
641, 643-644 (1988); State v. Davis, 139 Idaho 731, 734, 85 P.3d 1130, 1133 
(Ct App. 2003). 
C. The District Court Did Not Err In Denying Dotts' I.C.R. 35(a) Motion 
Idaho Criminal Rule 35(a) is a narrow rule that allows a trial court to 
correct a sentence that is illegal from the face of the record any time. State v. 
Clements, 148 Idaho 82, 84, 218 P.3d 1143, 1145 (2009). Whether a sentence 
is illegal is a question of law that is freely reviewed by the court on appeal. kl 
An illegal sentence under I.C.R. 35(a) is one in excess of a statutory provision or 
otherwise contrary to applicable law. State v. Alsanea, 138 Idaho 733, 7 45, 69 
P.3d 153, 165 (Ct. App. 2003). 
In this case, Dotts filed an I.C.R. 35(a) motion asserting that he was 
illegally denied credit for time he spent released on parole prior to revocation. 
(R., Vol. I, pp.169-173.) However, an I.C.R. 35(a) motion is not the proper 
mechanism for challenging an alleged error in the Department of Correction's 
calculations of a prisoner's sentence.2 See Mickelsen v. Idaho State Correctional 
Institution, 131 Idaho 352,355,955 P.2d 1131, 1134 (Ct. App. 1998). "[A] 
petition for writ of habeas corpus is an appropriate mechanism for challenging an 
alleged impropriety or error in the Department [of Correction's] computation of a 
prisoner's sentence." .Lg. (citing Bates v. Murphy, 118 Idaho 239, 243, 796 P.2d 
2 While the district court considered the merits of Dotts' I.C.R. 35(a) motion, a 
district court's lack of jurisdiction to reach the merits of an issue may be raised at 
any time. State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 757, 101 P.3d 699, 701 (2004). 
Further, this Court may affirm the district court's denial of the motion on any 
correct alternative theory. State v. Mireles. 133 Idaho 690, 694. 991 P.2d 878, 
882 (Ct. App. 1999). 
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116, 120 (1990); Calkins v. May, 97 Idaho 402, 545 P.2d 1008 (1976); State v. 
Vega. 113 Idaho 756, 758, 747 P.2d 778, 780 (Ct. App. 1987)). Since Dotts' 
I.C.R. 35(a) motion3 was not the appropriate mechanism to challenge the credit 
for time served while on parole, the district court did not err by denying the 
motion. 
Further, even if the merits of Dotts' I.C.R. 35(a) motion are considered, the 
district court still did not err by denying the motion. As the district court correctly 
concluded, and as Dotts acknowledges in his brief, a person is only entitled to 
credit for a period of actual incarceration, not for time the person in released on 
parole prior to revocation. (Appellant's brief, p. 4 (citing I.C. § 18-309; Winter v. 
State, 7 Idaho 103, 105-107, 785 P.2d 667, 669-671 (Ct. App. 1989).) As I.C. § 
20-228 provides, parole time prior to revocation is credited against a sentence of 
imprisonment only if the Commission for Pardons and Parole, in its discretion, 
authorizes it. See Gibson v. Bennett, 141 Idaho 270, 274-75, 108 P.3d 417, 
421-22 (Ct. App. 2005). Because Dotts was not entitled to credit for time spent 
on parole prior to revocation, his sentence was not illegal. Likewise, for the 
3 In addition to the I.C.R. 35(a) motion, Dotts also sought credit for time spent on 
parole release prior to revocation in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed in 
state court. See Dotts v. Little, 2014 Unpublished Opinion No. 814, Docket No. 
42135 (Idaho App., November 14, 2014). The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed 
the district court's dismissal of Dotts' habeas petition, holding that Dotts was not 
entitled to credit for time spent on parole release prior to revocation, and that this 
forfeiture of time did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of 
the Eighth Amendment. ~ Therefore, Dotts' argument in this appeal is barred, 
in the alternative, by the doctrine of res judicata. See State v. Rhoades, 134 
Idaho 862, 863, 11 P.3d 481, 482 (2000) (The doctrine of res judicata prevents 
re-litigation of issues that have been previously decided in a final judgment or 
decision in an action between the same litigants.). 
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reasons previously discussed by the Idaho Court of Appeals in Dotts v. Little, 
Dotts cannot show that the forfeiture of this parole time constituted cruel and 
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See Dotts, 2014 
Unpublished Opinion No. 814, pp.3-4 (finding no Eight Amendment violation 
where Dotts will have been incarcerated for 12 years, and on parole for nearly 
three and one-third years, upon the competition of the sentences imposed for 
grand theft and forgery). The district court therefore did not err when it denied 
Dotts' I.C.R. 35(a) motion to correct an illegal sentence. 
D. The District Court Did Not Err In Denying Dotts' I.C.R. 35(c) Motion 
Idaho Criminal Rule 35(c) permits a defendant to move "to correct a 
court's computation of credit for time served," where the time served was 
"granted pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 18-309 or 19-2603." Idaho Code§ 18-
309 requires courts to grant defendants credit for time served for "any period of 
incarceration prior to entry of judgment, if such incarceration was for the offense 
or an included offense which the judgment was entered." Idaho Code § 19-2603 
requires courts to grant individuals credit for time served from the date of service 
of a bench warrant, or the functional equivalent of a bench warrant, upon 
violation of a probation. See also State v. Covert, 143 Idaho 169, 139 P.3d 771 
(Ct. App. 2006). 
In this case, Dotts did not challenge the district court's computation of his 
pre-judgment incarceration, or its computation of any incarceration following the 
service of a bench warrant for a probation violation. Instead, Dotts asserted that 
the Idaho Department of Correction erred by failing to give him credit, upon his 
7 
parole revocation, for time served while he was in custody in Oregon on a 
separate case. (R., Vol. I, pp.191-192; Tr., p.7, Ls.5-10.) Because Dotts' 
challenge does not involve a granting of time served pursuant to either I.C. §§ 
18-309 or 19-2603, I.C.R. 35(c) is not the proper mechanism to bring such a 
challenge. Therefore, Dotts cannot show that the district court erred in 
dismissing this motion. 
Further, even if the merits of Dotts' I.C.R. 35(c) motion are considered, 
and even if I.C.R. 35(c) applied to credit for time served computations associated 
with the revocation of parole, the district still did not err when it denied the 
motion. There is no indication in the record that the detainer requested by the 
Idaho Department of Correction kept Dotts in custody past the completion of any 
Oregon sentence. (See State's Exhibits A, C.) Dotts did not argue to the 
contrary to the district court or on appeal. (See generally Tr.; Appellant's brief, 
p.5.) Therefore, the detainer did not constitute "the functional equivalent of a 
bench warrant." See State v. Kesling, 155 Idaho 673, 677-678, 315 P.3d 861, 
865-866 (Ct. App. 2013) (holding that because Kesling failed to show that he was 
held in Florida custody beyond the end of his Florida sentences, he could not 
show that any Idaho detainer request constituted "the functional equivalent of a 
bench warrant," and thus, Kesling was not entitled to any time served for time 
spent in Florida custody); compare with Covert, 143 Idaho at 170-171, 139 P.3d 
at 772-773 (Ct. App. 2006) (concluding that where Covert was simultaneously 
arrested on an agent's warrant for a probation violation, and for new criminal 
conduct, the agent's warrant was the "functional equivalent of a bench warrant," 
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because Covert could have bonded out on the new charges and been released if 
he had not been also held pursuant to the agent's warrant). 
Dotts cannot show that I.C.R. 35 was the proper mechanism for the 
challenges he raised in this case, or that he is entitled to relief based on a review 
of the merits of these challenges. He has therefore failed to show that the district 
court erred in denying his I.C.R. 35 motions. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
order denying Dotts' I.C.R. 35(a) motion to correct an illegal sentence, and his 
I.C.R. 35(c) motion correct the district court's computation of its sentence. 
DATED this 30th day of December 2014. 
Deputy Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 30th day of December 2014, served a 
true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a 
copy addressed to: 
KIMBERLY E. SMITH 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
MWO/pm 
MARK W. OLSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
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